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Abstract 
 
An evaluation of new public management in higher education: Same rationale, different 
implementation 
 
During the last decades, all OECD countries have implemented public sector reforms to increase the 
efficiency and to enhance the effectiveness and performance of public organisations (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). These reforms have also taken place in higher education, more or less to achieve 
the same objectives (Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle, 2011). The reforms OECD countries have been 
confronted with, have to a large extent been theoretically classified under the concept of New Public 
Management (NPM), emphasizing the accountability of the public sector and the focus on results 
(Hood, 1995). This paper discusses NPM and investigates its characteristics in higher education. It is 
divided into three parts. First, the concept of NPM and its characteristics are discussed. Second, the 
implications of NPM in higher education are illustrated. Third, on the basis of a literature review 
policy developments in HE in a select number of countries will be discussed within the NPM 
framework, with a focus on four key characteristics of NPM: marketization, budgetary reforms, 
autonomy complemented by accountability, and a new management style. We conclude with a brief 
overview and evaluation of NPM in higher education. We conclude that an ‘NPM pattern’ can be 
discerned in the rationale underlying the ‘modernisation’ of higher education, but that we can at the 
same time identify substantial differences between the countries with regard to the actual 
implementation of NPM-based reforms, that is, the timing, their intensity, and their content. 
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Presentation 
 
An evaluation of new public management in higher education: Same rationale, different 
implementation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decades, all OECD countries have implemented public sector reforms to increase the 
efficiency and to enhance the effectiveness and performance of public organisations (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). These reforms have also taken place in higher education (HE), more or less to achieve 
the same objectives (Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle, 2011). The reforms OECD countries have been 
confronted with, have to a large extent been theoretically classified under the concept of New Public 
Management (NPM), emphasizing the accountability of the public sector and the focus on results 
(Hood, 1995).  
This paper discusses NPM and investigates its characteristics in HE. It is divided into three parts. First, 
the concept of NPM and its characteristics are discussed. In a second stage the implications of NPM in 
HE are illustrated. Finally, policy developments in HE in 10 countries will be discussed within the NPM 
framework. We conclude with a brief overview and evaluation of NPM in HE. 
 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: DIVERSITY UNDER THE SAME UMBRELLA 
 
In the late 1970s, financial crises, bureaucracy, the heaviness of administrative procedures, and a 
decreasing level of public trust increased the discontent with the public sector (Pollitt, Van Thiel, and 
Homburg, 2007). Since then, public sector organisations and administrations worldwide have been 
modernized in order to increase their efficiency and effectiveness, to enhance their performance and to 
orient their services more to the expectations of their citizens (customers). This discontent has led to the 
introduction of new, managerialist ideas in the public sector and has been called the New Public 
Management (Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2007). The term NPM encompassed various new 
management styles (Hood, 1995). During the last decades, researchers worldwide have highlighted this 
trend and have investigated public sector reforms that have been carried out under the impulse of NPM 
principles. However, NPM is not a straightforward concept.  
First, NPM stands for the general idea that private practices, business concepts, techniques and values 
can improve public sector performance (Hood, 1995). This perspective actually states the superiority of 
private sector techniques assuming that its implementation in the public sector automatically leads to an 
improved performance.  
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From the literature, the following list of basic principles of NPM can be derived (Ferlie, Musselin and 
Andresani, 2008; Gruening, 2001; Osborne, 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000): (1) an attention to 
lesson-drawing from private-sector management; (2) the presence of hands-on management and the 
organizational distance between policy implementation and policy making; (3) entrepreneurial 
leadership; (4) input and output controls, evaluation and performance management and audit; (5) the 
disaggregation of public services to their most basic units and a focus on their cost management; (6) the 
growth of the use of markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation and service delivery 
within public services; (7) the will to treat service users as customers; and (8) the will to produce 
smaller, more efficient and results-oriented public sector organisations. During the last decades, many 
public sector organisations and administrations have been reforming according to (some of) those 
principles. As such, the basic idea of the reforms was highly comparable, which stresses some kind of 
uniformity.  
 
Second, NPM stands for not only a ‘general belief’ and a ‘basic idea’, but also for the various ways this 
general belief has been implemented in the concrete. In this sense, NPM is principally an umbrella 
concept, given the fact that the implementation has taken many forms and has been implemented with 
various levels of intensity and at different periods (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). This has also been 
argued by Pollitt et al. (2007, p. 4) who state that within Europe, the implementation of NPM can be 
likened to a ‘chameleon, constantly changing its appearance to blend with the local context’. Even in 
1995 it was already assumed that NPM would take numerous shapes within the OECD (Hood, 1995). 
 
Since its emergence, NPM has had its opponents and advocates (Osborne, 2006). Hood (1991) posits 
that the advocates saw NPM as an answer to the old bureaucracy and as such as the best route to success 
to modernize the public sector (see also Pollitt and Dan, 2011). The pro-NPM literature assumes that the 
application of business methods will result in a public sector that is cheaper, more efficient, and more 
responsive to its ‘customers’ (Pollitt and Dan, 2011). The opponents, states Hood (1991), argue that 
NPM has been an assault on a valuable public service and is only a vague packet without real content. It 
has an intra-governmental focus in an increasingly pluralist world (Osborne, 2006) and leads to side-
effects such as fragmentation, diminished coordination, lower social cohesion and negative 
consequences on personnel (Hammerschmid, Van de Walle, Oprisor and Stimac, 2013). NPM is 
suggested to have a limited geographical reach, focusing on Anglo-American, Australasian and (some) 
Scandinavian arenas (Osborne, 2006). Regarding the impact of NPM, some scholars argue that NPM 
was a disappointment to governments who implemented NPM reforms: they were confronted with 
negative experiences with management consultancy, with performance measurements that were reduced 
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to ‘happy sheets’ or ‘tick box exercises’, and with private ideas that were misfit to the peculiarities of 
the public sector (Curry, 2014).  
Pitching a side is difficult as empirical evidence regarding the outcomes and effects of NPM are scarce. 
As Pollitt and Dan (2011, pp. 51-52) state: “there have been endless publications concerned with NPM-
like programmes and techniques. Yet, our solid, scientific knowledge of the general outcomes of all this 
thinking and activity is very limited”. In other words: NPM has to a large extent been investigated in 
terms of implementation and processes, but not in terms of outcomes. Little is known about whether 
NPM ‘works’ and whether it actually results in increased efficiency and lower costs. 
 
This overall skepticism has led to a period of post-NPM paradigms. For instance, the concept of ‘whole-
of-government’ was introduced, emphasizing integration and coordination instead of the economic 
perspective and the perceived disaggregated effect of NPM reforms (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007). 
Another example is ‘digital-era-governance’, a concept emphasizing the role of IT-centered changes and 
focusing on reintegration, needs-based holism and digitization, striving to reintegrate functions into the 
government thereby closely connecting technological, organizational, cultural and social effects 
(Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler, 2005). Another perspective is that of New Public Governance 
(NPG), wherein public management reforms are perceived as a variety of interactive forms of governing 
that are less ‘centered’ and are more based on interactivity, transparency, collaboration and participation 
between stakeholders and networks. NPG is often used as a new umbrella concept to define the 
difference between the new and older modes of governing (Osborne, 2006). As an umbrella concept, 
NPG encompasses a cluster of principles, such as process focus, co-ordination, participation and co-
production (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2014). The three highlighted post-NPM concepts to a high degree 
emphasize the same elements: more integration, inter-connectedness, and inter-organizational networks. 
In this way, these newer concepts are a reaction to the economic principles and ideas underlying NPM.  
 
Now that we have defined NPM as a general concept, we can specify in the next paragraph what the 
characteristics of NPM are when applied to higher education. 
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NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION  
 
Reforming HE 
Higher education institutions (HEIs) have during the last decades been subjected to many reforms, 
encouraged by the emergence of the knowledge society, economic crises, increased competition, and 
demographic evolutions (Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle, 2011). Within that context, European and other 
countries have been seeking new ways to steer the HE sector (de Boer and File, 2009). In the context of 
budgetary restrictions governments have been reducing their expenditure on HE and have increasingly 
introduced the market as a new coordination mechanism (Middlehurst and Teixeira, 2012). Other 
management principles such as liberalisation and privatisation have also become part of HE governance 
in many countries (de Boer, Enders and Jongbloed, 2009; Broucker and De Wit, 2013). Generally 
speaking, one could state that those reform tendencies aimed to increase the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of the HE sector in the same way governments have tried to do in other public sector 
organisations and policy domains. As a result, the principles of NPM have to large extent been 
introduced in HE in Europe and beyond, be it quite often partially. 
As a concept with clear roots in neo-liberalism, NPM became a general approach to governance and 
management in the public sector (Goedegebuure and Hayden, 2007). Through isomorphic processes, 
NPM also evolved into becoming a transnational myth about what constitutes a rational management 
structure for HEIs (Kretek et al., 2013). HEIs were from then on considered as organisations, rather than 
as sui generis collegial structures, with the company as an ideal type leading the direction of governance 
reforms (Kretek et al., 2013; Tahar and Boutellier, 2013). In other words, reforms based on NPM were 
introduced to transform a state-dependent organisation into a complete organisation wherein aspects as 
identity, hierarchy and rationality were introduced (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). In this 
context new university models emerged, such as the entrepreneurial university (Clark, 1998) and the 
adaptive university (Sporn, 1999). The governance reforms have mostly followed the route laid out by 
the NPM concept (de Boer et al., 2008; Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2013).  
However, the principles of NPM are not implemented in every HE sector in the same way or to the same 
degree (Broucker and De Wit, 2013), which is comparable with other sectors that have been subjected to 
NPM: “[t]here is no predominant model for higher education governance in Europe: diversity remains 
the hallmark of European higher education” (Eurydice, 2008, p. 104). In other words, the national 
context is important to understand HE governance in a given system, because “the same reform 
repertoire gives birth to interpretations that vary from one country and from one university to the other” 
(Paradeise, 2012, p. 596). As a result of the path dependency of the implementation of NPM (Dill, 
2011), it seems that NPM, also in HE, is an umbrella or chameleon-like concept that can be used for 
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various guises of governance reform. The question then is what characteristics can be identified when 
NPM is applied in HE?  
 
NPM- characteristics  
Several authors have summarized the characteristics NPM would have within HE. Marginson (2009) 
emphasizes corporatisation reform, growth in student fee-charging, an expansion of the role of private 
institutions, encouragement of commercial business activity in research, the creation of competition for 
parcels of government-provided resources, and output modeling. The OECD accentuates leadership 
principles, incentives, and competition between public sector agencies and private entities to enhance 
the outcomes and cost efficiency of public services (Hénard and Mitterle, 2006). Bleiklie and Michelsen 
(2013) stress hierarchisation (leadership and management), budgetary constraints, the formalization of 
evaluation, and the increased autonomy for institutions. Ferlie et al. (2008) arrive at a list of ten 
characteristics, including market-based reforms such as the stimulation of competition for students and 
funding and the encouragement of private sector providers; the development of real prices for student 
fees and research contracts; the development of audit and checking systems; and vertical steering with 
stronger and more overt managerialism. 
In sum, NPM in HE contains a wide range of characteristics, which can be classified under four broad 
areas. Although the delineation of these four areas is not clear-cut, they do offer a solid approach to 
analyse reforms in HE in different contexts. 
 
Table 4.1 NPM-areas in Higher Education 
 
Marginson (2009) Hénard and 
Mitterle (2006) 
Bleiklie and 
Michelsen (2013) 
Ferlie et al. (2008) 
Market-based 
reforms 
Role expansion of 
private institutions; 
encouragement of 
commercial activity; 
competition creation 
competition 
between public 
agencies and 
private entities  
 
competition for students and 
funding; market entrance 
encouragement and failure 
acceptability  
Budgetary 
reforms 
Growth in student fee-
charging 
Financial 
incentives 
Budgetary 
constraints 
Value for money; real prices 
development and introduction 
of higher student fees; 
hardening of soft budgetary 
constraints 
Autonomy, 
accountability 
and 
performance 
Output modeling Incentives 
Formalization of 
evaluation; more 
autonomy 
Performance measurement 
and monitoring; audit and 
checking systems; vertical 
steering  
New 
management 
style and new 
management 
techniques 
corporatization reform 
leadership 
principles 
Hierarchisation 
development of strong 
executive and managerial 
roles; reduction in faculty 
representation; local 
government influence 
reduction 
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It is clear that NPM contains a diversity of elements, but in the actual implementation of reforms not 
every element needs to be implemented to the same extent to be able to call it an NPM reform (de Boer 
et al., 2008). In the next sections we discuss to what extent the four elements are present in some 
countries and what this means for HE, since, as Bleiklie already stated in 1998: “introducing these ideas 
in a public university system should make an apt case for the exploration of the potential and limitations 
of NPM as a universal approach to management reform. In Higher Education, where institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom are fundamental values, the compatibility between the rationale of the 
reform policies and the substantive field in which they are supposed to operate is posed more acutely 
than in most other policy fields” (p. 299).  
 
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON  
 
In this section we use the above classification to briefly discuss the core NPM elements in seven 
countries representing the different administrative traditions discerned by Bleiklie and Michelsen 
(2013): England, New Zealand and the United States for the Anglo-American tradition, the Netherlands 
and Flanders for the Germanic tradition, Portugal for the Napoleonic tradition, and Finland for the 
Scandinavian tradition. With this selection, we include both early NPM adopters (the Netherlands and 
especially England and New Zealand) and latecomers (Portugal, Finland). Next to those countries, we 
present results from three Eastern-Europe countries: Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania which can be 
characterized by a mixture of Germanic, Napoleonic and state centered former Socialist/Soviet 
traditions of higher education governance.  
 
Market based reforms 
Many OECD governments have moved towards increased marketisation of the HE sector, in a bid for 
the enhancement of efficiency and accountability, whilst reducing the financial burden for the 
government (Meek and Davies, 2009).  
In Portugal, throughout the 2000s changes have been framed within NPM (Magalhães et al., 2013; 
Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Based on OECD recommendations that HEIs should still be supported 
financially by the government, but should operate within the private sector, the government accorded in 
2007 a new legal status to universities, together with a state budget drop urging them to generate more 
income (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). At the same time, the role of the provision of HE changed: the 
development of the private sector has been encouraged to cover the capacity lack in HE (Ferlie, 
Musselin and Andresani, 2008). This has increased competition between institutions for attracting 
students (Cardoso, Carvalho and Santiago, 2011). The question remains whether Portugal will evolve 
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towards full liberalisation, with, among other things a deregulation of employment conditions for 
professors and researchers (Kauko and Diogo, 2011).  
In England increasing competitive pressure has been the key change (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 
2008), in the first place between existing HEIs, but also by allowing private providers to become 
degree-granting institutions. These private activities – sometimes established in partnership with public 
HEIs – “blur existing boundaries around the sector with the result that it is both more diverse, more 
flexible, and in a number of cases, less accountable” (Robertson, 2010, p. 31). The implementation of 
NPM principles has involved cutting budgets and tightening controls, creating internal competition, and 
introducing monitoring mechanisms (Shattock, 2008). This scenario was implemented at the system 
level but had an equivalent impact on the institutional level, leading to an emphasis on the primacy of 
management over bureaucratic procedures, towards monitoring of performance and auditing quality, and 
to the establishment of (financial) targets (Shattock, 2008).  
This is comparable to the United States where HE is basically characterised by strong competition 
(Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011; Ramirez and Christensen, 2013). The US HE system is highly complex 
with 4350 accredited degree-granting colleges and universities which range from public to private for-
profit institutions, two-year community colleges to doctoral degree-granting institutions. HEIs have 
undergone a transformation since the early 1980s (AASCU 2010). The boundary between university and 
external environment has become much less defined due to government policies and institutional 
strategies encouraging more interactions with the market (Bok, 2003; Geiger, 2004; Leisyte and Dee, 
2012; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  Competition in the US has been strongly underpinned by 
competition for students as they are key in generating income , whereby the constant increase in fee 
levels over the years has intensified the competition. As noted by Geiger and Heller (2011, p. 9-10) the 
‘beauty contest’ has increased competition and the university gaming with tuition fees, aid and various 
other market-oriented phenomena in US higher education. The top HEIs have been participating in the 
‘arms race’ for the best students and have been increasing their costs of education, whereby the belief 
has been created that the higher the spending, the more likely to attract the best students, and the better 
the quality of education (Ibid.). In contrast to many European HE systems, US universities enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy demonstrated in limited governmental funding and low degrees of regulation. 
Another important feature is strong central management on the one hand and strong disciplinary 
departments on the other. Professional management of US universities and their entrepreneurial 
orientation has been well accounted for in the literature (Bok, 2005, Geiger and Sa 2008, Leisyte and 
Dee, 2012).  
In the Netherlands, the concept of ‘steering at a distance’ was introduced in 1985, meaning that the 
government only defines the general framework for HE (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008). 
  
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Incentives-based funding has led to market-type behavior and a more distinct profiling by the HEIs (ib.). 
In other words, HEIs were re-defined as strategic actors that have to take responsibility for “maintaining 
quality, providing an adequate range of teaching and research programmes, and ensuring access to 
higher education” (Maassen, Moen and Stensaker, 2011, p. 487).  
In Finland universities have traditionally been under strict legal control as they were in fact part of the 
national administration. However, a new law was drawn up over 2008-2009 introducing an 
entrepreneurial culture. The main aim was to increase autonomy for universities, “which will be 
afforded legal status in their own right, and will have much increased financial freedom” (Aarrevaara et 
al., 2009, p. 5).  
In Hungary the HE system is institutionally diversified, with state and non-state universities, and  state 
and non-state colleges (Jongbloed et al., 2008). The establishment and operation of HEIs are regulated 
by the 2005 Higher Education Act. Every institution may launch academic programmes after consent of 
the Hungarian Accreditation Committee (Jongbloed et al., 2008). The number of students admitted is 
limited. The Ministry of Education announces the number of state-financed places in each study field. 
Institutions can open further places according to their capacity where the students pay the cost of the 
education. Hungary has a highly developed, but small, system of private HE. Non-state institutions must 
gain state recognition and approval, but it is said that this is a long and bureaucratic process (Singh & 
Marcucci, 2008). In 2005 the allocation of state-funded bachelor students changed. Instead of using a 
quota system to limit the number of students for each institution and subject area, quotas were set for 
major study fields: students were ranked by their secondary school results. Those with results good 
enough to be within the quota would be state-financed and the institutions to which they are admitted 
would receive the funding “attached” to the students. This would increase competition. This new system 
seems to be more performance oriented: in the old system, places were allocated among institutions and 
all institutions got state-funded places. Weaker institutions were usually selected by less talented 
students. In the new system students with the best result select first and their choices determine the 
allocation of state-funded places. 
In general, the Law on Education from 1991 determined the overall structure of Latvian HE. In this act, 
the establishment of private HEIs was allowed followed by the introduction of tuition fees. As a result, 
the HE system in Latvia contains both public and private higher education providers. The public sector 
is the largest (Jongbloed et al., 2008). In general, the influx of students  since 1997 has been made 
possible by expanding the existing institutions, and by creating new institutions. Important here is the 
expansion of the private sector, and the creation of regional HEIs. Although the legal framework 
concerning external quality assurance is equal for public and private higher education institutions, there 
are still differences as to the institutional autonomy of these institutions, not least in their management 
   
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structure, and in how detailed they are regulated. For example, while private higher education 
institutions can choose freely which language a given study programme may be taught in, this is much 
more limited for the public institutions.  Private higher education institutions, with some exceptions, do 
not receive state budget funding. Both public and private higher education institutions charge tuition 
fees, and the institutions can decide on the level of fees themselves (Jongbloed et al., 2008). 
In Lithuania reforms influenced by NPM – or at least, changes in the policy rhetoric – have started in 
2000s (Leisyte and Kizniene, 2006). After regaining its independence in 1990, Lithuania has 
restructured all is public sectors, including higher education. The Law on Science and Higher Education 
of 1991 defined the boundaries of state regulation and granted the universities full autonomy (Leisyte 
and Kizniene, 2006). The Lithuanian Law on Higher Education (2000) defined the governing structure 
of HE. The Government, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Parliament (Seimas) and a number 
of specialist organizations such as the Lithuanian Science Council, the Rectors’ conference and the 
Centre for Quality Assessment were then important actors involved in steering higher education 
institutions. A  retreat from regulation to more output-oriented approaches of state guidance could be 
observed from 2009 on, when the new Law of Higher Education (2009) decentralized higher education 
governance. The new law has liberalized the ‘market’ of higher education by allowing high tuition fees 
and introducing a ‘student voucher’ system, as well as by introducing more performance orientation 
with regard to research. The accession to the EU in 2005 and the consequent availability of funding 
through the EU’s Structural Funds has further increased the drive for competition in the Lithuanian 
higher education sector (Leisyte et al. 2014). At the same time, new performance monitoring 
instruments have been put in place (also with the help of EU Structural Funds) in the period 2009-2014, 
which have increased accountability of universities to the state. 
New Zealand adopted already in the 1980s neo-liberalism into its HE. It was argued that differences in 
the social status of different kinds of institutions was outdated and “buttressed by funding regimes that 
awarded universities higher levels of government support” (Strathdee, 2011, p. 28). The guaranteed 
funding for HEIs was abolished, government funding was made more equal across different kinds of 
institutions offering similar kinds of training, and a system of tuition fees was introduced (Strathdee, 
2011). This led to a quasi-market in HE, but had unintended effects (Strathdee, 2011): many new 
providers opted to offer degrees in competition with universities, and the cost of provision to the state 
grew enormously. In reaction, new policies were introduced in 1999. From then on, the government 
could determine what kind of training and how much of this training can be offered by HE providers; 
and research funding was concentrated in research intensive institutions (Strathdee, 2011).  
Market-based reforms are unlikely to happen in Flanders (Broucker and De Wit, 2013), where 
liberalization and privatization do not get a foot on the ground and the HE system continues to be 
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strongly state regulated. Private providers can enter the market, but need to comply with strict 
regulations including for instance coming to an agreement with an existing HEI and getting recognition 
from the government, which makes entrance to the ‘market’ highly conditional and far from obvious. 
 
Budgetary reforms 
Budgetary reforms to steer on performance whilst granting more autonomy is perceived as a typical 
NPM tool. In most countries the state remains the main funder, albeit that funding is allocated on both 
input and output indicators and in competitive ways (Jongbloed, 2008).  
Although the recent Finnish reforms have turned universities into independent legal entities with more 
possibilities to seek private funding, the state remains the principal source of income (Kauko and Diogo, 
2011; Aarrevaara et al., 2009).  
Also in Portugal, public HE has traditionally relied on state funding, whereas private institutions only 
can rely on state scholarships for their students (File, 2008). From the mid-1990s onwards, government 
policies have increased the focus on competition for research funds and have promoted public-private 
partnerships (Magalhães and Santiago, 2011). Since 2005, the allocation mechanism became 
progressively based on performance and quality indicators, but due to frequent changes in the criteria, 
little has changed in terms of the budget each HEI receives (Teixeira, 2010).  
The competition for funding is, as already highlighted above, very strong in England, especially 
through the Research Assessment Exercise or Research Excellence Framework as it is now called. 
Introduced in 1986, this research assessment clearly installed competition between institutions 
(Robertson, 2010). The overall funding system changed even further in 1992 when the polytechnics 
were relabeled as universities, a decision followed by budget cuts and the increase in tuition fees for 
students up to 25% of the cost of an average study programme (Robertson, 2010). Finally, in 2012, 
student fees were increased, capped at GBP 9 000 per year (Eurydice, 2014). 
This competitive context for funding can also be seen in the US: while in the 1990s performance 
funding was popular, it was dropped by several states during the mid-2000s. However, these policies 
have re-emerged after the recession.  Since 2013, 33 governors have committed to pursuing 
performance funding and results-oriented efforts for HE (Rutherford and Rabovski, 2014). States use 
performance-based funding systems as a way to deal with decreasing state funding and increasing 
pressure to improve performance. Under these systems, institutions are funded based on performance 
measures such as credit-hour completion and graduation rates (Leisyte and Enders, 2013). Next to state-
funding, colleges and universities have funds from different sources, such as tuition and fee payments, 
grants, contracts from governments, private gifts, and so on (Eckel and King, 2004). The main trends in 
terms of competition among institutions in the US have been a constant increase in student fees they 
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charge as well as mission drift towards competing for the best human resources and federal research 
grants (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). However, a distinction has to be made between public and private 
institutions when it comes to fee levels. At the same time, even if we explore public HEIs in the US, the 
difference in ratio between the income generated from the state and that from private sources is large 
compared to the situation for European institutions (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). In the US public HEIs 
(depending on the state) may receive around 15% of its income from the state, while in the European 
context, the public HEIs receive sometimes 90% of their income from state sources (Leisyte and Dee, 
2012). Having low dependency on the state purse makes US universities much more dependent on the 
market (such as private donations, private foundations,  contract research, tuition fees and their 
endowments). The US federal budget for HE is determined yearly and this budget is the main source of 
needs-based financial aid for students and for the appropriations of the community colleges.  
In the Netherlands, according to de Boer, Enders and Schimank (2008, p. 44), “the tools of government 
increasingly changed from directives to financial incentives”, with performance funding and contractual 
relations between state and HEIs on the rise. Government funding consists of a closed envelope 
distributed on the basis of performance indicators such as the number of degrees and PhD’s awarded, 
the establishment of research schools, and strategic research funding (de Weert and Boezerooy, 2007). 
Hungary changed its funding system over the years, starting with the introduction of formula funding in 
1996 (Jongbloed, de Boer, Enders & File, 2008), which was mainly input-based. In 2001 the possibility 
for students to get a loan was introduced. The system applied an interest close to the market interest rate, 
which made it, from a government perspective, self-sustainable (Jongbloed et al., 2008). In 2005, the 
formulate funding was adjusted to the Bologna-system. Next to that, a debate took place on student 
contributions, introduced in 2006 to be abolished again in 2008. At the same time it was made possible 
for students to gain the status of “cost-covering” (self-financed): students who were not state-funded 
were admitted to the system. The number of cost-covering students is limited by the institution’s 
capacity (Jongbloed et al., 2008).  In the years 2012 and 2013, the budget for education has been 
reduced significantly (Berács, Rubos, Kováts & Temesi, 2014). The state fund withdrawals were 
supported by the "self-supporting higher education" concept, but in December 2012 the students found 
the situation so unacceptable that they demanded negotiations. As a result of the negotiations the 
number and the distribution of state-funded places slightly changed compared to the original concepts. 
In addition, since 2012, new students may opt for a restricted-use loan at 2% interest for financing the 
tuition fee - in addition to the traditional loan (see above) at an interest rate of 7.5% (Eurydice, 2015). 
Furthermore, the government representative formulated a new strategic vision for November 2013. This 
agreement includes new elements only concerning the distribution and does not stop the withdrawal of 
state funds. By 2014 this resulted in the reduction of the direct expenditure of the budget on higher 
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education by a third in five years. This process was not accompanied by the clarification of funding 
principles. Nowadays, the HEIs have started implementing ad hoc survival strategies (Berács et al., 
2014). 
In 2001, Latvia introduced formula funding to improve results and outcomes: funding is allocated on 
the basis of a contract between the individual institutions and the ministry responsible for that 
institution.  For many HEIs the income from the state funding system only cover for less than half of the 
budget. In addition, the state budget is channeled through various ministries who have ownership of 
certain institutions. Furthermore, regional authorities and municipalities may also fund institutions. In 
general, this creates a very diversified funding system, which on the one hand is beneficial for 
institutions to be able to increase their total funding through parallel funding, but which on the other 
hand is making control and monitoring of resources difficult. Since January 2009 institutional autonomy 
concerning the possibility to reallocate resources internally has increased. Funding is currently given 
through a lump-sum, and institutions are free to use this autonomously. This also includes institutional 
autonomy in how to spend the income generated from tuition (Jongbloed et al., 2008). In 2014, the 
Ministry of Education and Science has prepared a draft concept for a new financing model. It preserves 
financing study places as a basis for system stability and sustainability, but it also includes additional 
performance-based funding, as well as targeted funding for strategic objectives and innovation. 
However, in order to implement this new model an increase of investment in HE is necessary. 
Therefore, the Ministry has requested additional funding for the new financing model from 2015 
(Eurydice, 2015). 
In Lithuania there were attempts to introduce performance-based agreements between the universities 
and the Minister of Education and Science in 2000s. Initially these were agreements regarding the 
number of students to be educated in different disciplines and there were attempts to introduce changes 
to the formula funding of universities. However, in practice, this was not implemented due to an 
extensive lobby processes of various stakeholders (Dobbins and Leisyte, 2014). At the same time 
university budgets have increasingly diversified by including tuition fees, service contracts as well as 
contract research. However, this has changed after the 2009 Law on Higher Education, which has 
strengthened the output orientation of HE funding. After the 2000 HE Law, public HE institutions were 
increasingly financed from the state budget through lump-sum budgets. Allocations to institutions were 
determined according to the formula funding, where 50% of funds were based on historical earmarking 
and the remaining 50% was calculated according to the increase in student numbers, demand for 
research and capital activities, teacher qualifications and the ratio of students per teacher. Since the HE 
Law 2009 the funding allocations have shifted towards a formula with a stronger mixture of input- and 
output-based indicators, where research performance is becoming more important (Dobbins and Leisyte, 
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2014). Today the most important sources of income at the discretion of universities are contract research 
and student fees. The HE Law 2009 introduced student vouchers, and tuition fees were sharply 
increased for all students varying per discipline (Ibid.). Funding for research is allocated to universities 
from the state budget based on a formula in which output indicators such as the number of journal 
publications and produced PhD degrees are important. 
Given the criticism on neo-liberalism in New Zealand, in 2002 it was decided that the government only 
funds providers to deliver HE according to individual ‘investment plans’ (designed to increase 
differences between different types of providers and to increase the labor market relevance of the 
training provided). Investment plans are developed by all providers and set out the areas wherein 
providers are to offer training and detail the number of state-funded places that can be offered to 
students in each institution. Besides, to limit the cost of tuition to students, a fee-maxima policy was 
introduced (Strathdee, 2011). At this point, every university is part-funded (around 50 per cent of total 
income) by the Government (Ministry of Education, 2015). 
The government in Flanders introduced a new funding mechanism in 2009, thereby moving clearly 
away from input financing and toward output financing. No longer the number of students, but criteria 
such as the number of degrees awarded and research performance indicators (publications, citations, …) 
are used to distribute funding among the HEIs. Nevertheless, although resource allocation has become 
more competitive, the state remains by far the main funding body for higher education (Broucker & De 
Wit, 2013). 
 
Autonomy, accountability and performance 
HE has, in many countries, shifted from a state control model to a state supervisory model (Neave and 
Van Vught, 1991; Meek and Davies, 2009). This has enlarged the freedom of HEIs, increasing 
significantly their autonomy, but moderated by accountability (Meek and Davies, 2009).  
The Netherlands introduced this idea in 1985, when the government declared its ’steering at a distance’ 
policy. This strategy was adopted by law in 1993 implementing a transition from ex-ante standards and 
rules to ex post evaluation, implying accountability and performance. This increased autonomy and 
accountability, while the government retained strong correctional powers. Both internal and external 
evaluations of teaching and research are obligatory, and as of 2007 a supervisory board of external 
stakeholders, appointed by the minister, was installed for each institution (de Boer et al., 2010). The 
relationship between HEIs and the government has increasingly become a contractual relationship: HEIs 
develop strategic plans but within parameters negotiated with the government (de Boer, Enders and 
Schimank, 2008).  
This kind of reform is not straightforward for all countries: for instance, in Finland, management by 
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results has been implemented to increase the performance of HEIs. According to Kauko and Diogo 
(2011) this system is opposed, as it has been implemented as in other public sector domains, forced by 
the Ministry of Finance, and without taking the peculiarities of universities into account.  
In England governmental pressure on HEIs has been intensified, albeit starting from a point where 
government intervention was very low. The ‘British exception’ of independence from the state has 
gradually been overruled by state intervention and even implied “state micro-management on a scale 
comparable to other European systems” (Shattock, 2008). In the process research funding has become 
heavily reliant on indicators. Also in teaching and education evaluation indicators have become part and 
parcel of HE policies, through quality assessment of subjects and institutional audits. The results of 
these assessments are published and can, as such, lead to reputational consequences influencing the 
level of income (Capano, 2011).  
In Portugal HEIs “are able to determine their own mission and strategy but within a policy framework 
and set of regulations that constrain their choices, mainly because the public funding has been reduced 
progressively” (de Boer and File 2009, p. 30). There is state interference in that an accreditation system 
was put in place for both study programmes and institutions, a minimal number of students for study 
programmes was introduced, and in the allocation system quality indicators were included (Magalhães 
and Santiago, 2011). HEIs have also been made more accountable to external stakeholders (see also 
above): an executive council has been established with almost a third of members being external 
stakeholders, on top of the verticalisation of internal decision-making (Teixeira, 2010). 
Before 2005, state-owned institutions in Hungary had to operate as budgetary organizations. In 2005, 
The Higher Education Act improved the financial autonomy of HEIs, not by changing their general 
position, but by empowering them to take financial decisions easier. For instance, institutions were 
allowed to retain and accumulate residual amounts, to keep their own income in a separate account 
(Jongbloed et al., 2008). Apart from that, performance contracts were introduced in 2006, wherein the 
Ministry guarantees an agreed flow of funds for three years, as a result of negotiations between each 
institution and the Ministry. The HEIs take the responsibility to increase their performance, while goal 
achievement and progress is monitored (Jongbloed et al., 2008). Despite those efforts, Hungary 
continues to be characterized by a general lack of transparency and inadequate funding, increasing 
institutions’ dependency and vulnerability (Berács et al., 2014). In general, their autonomy has 
narrowed, certainly regarding organization and management (e.g. ministerial appointment of rectors and 
general directors for management, appearance of financial inspectors). Indeed, the government plays a 
key role in the governance of higher education as they fulfil tasks regarding organisation, development 
and legality control  (Eurydice, 2015). 
In Latvia, the law was amended in 2006 establishing all state higher education institutions as 
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“autonomous public entities”. This created a more clarified relationship between Ministry and HEIs. It 
is currently expected that the Ministry regularly develops a more overarching and long-term policy and 
strategy for higher education, while HEI have formulated and implemented their own strategies and 
plans. As a result, HEIs are currently independent legal bodies: they can take initiatives to establish a 
more diversified funding base.  
In Lithuania after 1990 universities regained their autonomy from the state in certain areas (Leisyte and 
Kizniene, 2006). They are free to design their own policies and strategic plans as well as govern 
themselves, they are free to develop their curriculum, to select their students and appoint academic staff. 
However, they have to follow the Law on Higher Education 2009 in terms of governance arrangements 
of university boards and quality assurance procedures. Further, they are subject to state monitoring via 
capacity reviews carried out by the State Monitoring Agency. The accountability of universities to 
external funding bodies such as the Lithuanian Research Council lies in the form of progress reports of 
the funded projects. When it comes to state steering of research, it takes place via various funding 
instruments, especially through the National Science Programmes and the Programme of National 
Science Valleys, which have provided significant funding for research infrastructure development for 
selected universities. 
The changes introduced in New Zealand created a new approach to funding and monitoring. As already 
stated, the government invests in areas of education that meet its strategic objectives (Freeman, 2014). 
Institutions must have charters that outline a provider’s contribution to HE and to its stakeholders, and 
that reflect regional variations in the demand for skills. In turn, this feeds into the policies and practices 
of the universities, which invest in areas that match the priorities established by the government. An 
important new method which increased HE performance is the publishing since 2008 of the external 
evaluation and review of providers, and which contributed to the government’s future funding decisions. 
As a result this is truly a performance based funding system (Ministry of Education, 2015). In addition, 
other performance information (e.g. retention and completion rates) about HE providers were made 
more widely available to allow students and employers to make informed decisions about education, 
and to create an incentive for providers to improve performance (Strathdee, 2011). 
Some of the above described elements can also be seen in the US: the last few decades policy-makers 
have demanded the universities to account for their performance, and public universities are required to 
collect, report, and analyze data across a wide range of performance indicators (Rutherford and 
Rabovski, 2014). Further, reporting regarding the performance has been an important instrument for 
strategic decision-makers within the institutions. The changes in the governance arrangements also have 
implied giving autonomy to public institutions in the area of tuition setting and reducing the powers of 
the statewide coordinating boards (McLendon, 2003). As discussed in Leisyte and Dee (2012), the 
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massification in enrollments led many states to create consolidated governing boards or state 
coordinating boards to enhance rationality and efficiency in the use of resources and to plan across 
institutional sectors. It is suggested that this trend led to both greater decentralization and great 
centralization at the same time (Eckel and Morphew, 2009). Decentralization occurs with the greater 
autonomy of universities from the statewide coordinating boards and this gives university administrators 
the possibility to set the strategic priorities for their institutions. At the same time, this decentralization 
may lead to centralization of internal governance if the authority of institutional management is 
enhanced (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). As greater autonomy means greater accountability, the 
administration gains authority via the usage of various indicators of productivity and efficiency, such as 
graduation rates and faculty workloads (Dill, 2001). 
Universities depend strongly on their Boards of Trustees as well as the state Boards when it comes to 
state HEIs (Dee 2006, Dill 2001). Certain priorities set by the state may have an impact on the state 
funding for specific research areas - which indirectly can steer the activities of university researchers. In 
the US the States are responsible for higher education policy. The federal government is largely 
responsible for the student financial aid programmes as well as for the research funding through its 
agencies. The priorities of federal funding agencies have a similar effect when it comes to steering 
research priorities. However, when it comes to the internal governance of universities, they are quite 
autonomous from the federal and state governmental steering. 
While the National Research Council conducts an elaborate ranking exercise for graduate programs 
approximately once per decade (Hicks, 2009), the far more ubiquitous rankings are produced by US 
News and World Report. Rankings do not have direct financial implications, but constitute a quasi-
objective, third-party assessment of institutional quality, and therefore can convey prestige to the 
institutions that acquire high ratings and thus have indirect effects. Bastedo and Bowman (2011) found 
that university rankings in 1998 significantly predicted financial measures in 2006. After controlling for 
prior reputation, higher rankings were associated with attracting larger amounts of research funding 
from government and industry, and obtaining donations from a higher proportion of alumni (Leisyte and 
Dee, 2012).  
The funding that HEIs in Flanders receive from the government, both the lump sum basic funding and 
the funding distributed competitively through research funds, is for the most part awarded as a lump 
sum to the institutions. This leaves the HEIs with some discretionary powers in how to spend the 
funding. Since the state reforms of the 1990s, deregulation and autonomy were indeed key principles in 
higher education reform, albeit coupled with accountability (De Wit & de Boer, 2010). HEIs are free to 
determine content, teaching methods, and research programmes, although funding priorities and 
financial incentives made available by the government may have an impact (De Wit & de Boer, 2010). 
  	
 An evaluation of new public management in higher education: Same rationale, different implementation 
 
 
New management style 
The last broad area of NPM relates to the introduction of a new management style, typified by 
corporatization, verticalisation, hierarchisation, leadership, and the demise of representative governance 
structures.  
Portugal implemented several changes regarding their governmental bodies in HEI’s. First, HEI’s 
should be governed by a government-appointed board of trustees (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Rectors 
used to be elected by the university assembly, but would now be elected by secret ballot by the General 
Council. Second, university senates, formerly the governing body in Portugese HEI’s, lost power and 
sometimes even disappeared (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Third, in addition to academic and student 
representatives, 30% of members of the General Council should consist of individuals who do not 
belong to the institution. Finally, administrative councils have been replaced by management boards 
with identical responsibilities: administrative, financial and human resources management of the 
institution (Kauko and Diogo, 2011).  
In Finland, public universities have a board, a rector and a university collegiate body. The highest 
executive body, the board, would consist of 7 to 14 members, of whom at least 40% are external 
stakeholders. The rector is elected by the board and holds the main executive power. In private 
institutions, the main organs are the board, the rector and an “overall multi-member administrative 
body”. The latter can be compared to the collegiate body of a public university. The rector is elected by 
the board and has approximately the same executive power as rectors in public universities. One of the 
most significant changes was the re-formulation of the rector’s position: while this person used to be 
elected by the university community, he has now become more or less a CEO responsible to the board 
(Kauko and Diogo, 2011).  
Countries like the Netherlands also passed new laws and created similar university boards, who would 
consist, partly or exclusively of non-university members, and were expected “to play the role of an 
American board of trustees, while setting priorities, approving budget and validating strategies” (Ferlie 
et al., 2008, p. 334). In the Netherlands, this had led to centralization of decision-making at the top of 
HEIs, increased executive leadership, and a declining role for collegial bodies (de Boer and File, 2009; 
de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008).  
In England corporate management was strengthened; at the post-1992 universities’ (former 
polytechnics) managerialism was at the heart of governance reforms, but also later in the pre-1992 
universities this seemed to comply best with the exigencies of funding councils (Shattock, 2008). The 
allocation of resources and the drawing up of quality rankings has increased pressures on academic staff 
to do more with less (Deem, 2011). There are also internal pressures in the form of “explicit and overt 
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management of academic staff and their work by academic managers and career administrators” (Deem, 
2011, p. 48). In sum, this has resulted in a verticalisation of internal decision-making and a weakening 
of the collegial power of the academic bodies, and externally in more competition and institutional 
differentiation. Nevertheless, although collegial governance is under threat, it seems that top and middle 
management have acted in favor of traditional academic values and practices. Managers often are 
manager-academics pursuing policies in response to external pressures but with respect for academic 
traditions (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008), whilst asserting their ‘right to manage’ (Deem and 
Brehony, 2008).  
In Hungary a  decrease in policy priority towards education has been observable, partly because 
governmental responsibility for HE had been divided among several ministries. The appointment of a 
new minister of state for higher education has somehow ameliorated the relationship between 
ministry and institutions, though significant change did not happen (Berács et al., 2014). The Higher 
Education Act of 1993 prescribed the internal structure of HEIs, including the responsibilities assigned 
to each governing body. With the integration process in 2000, the internal governance structure was not 
legally modified: the Senate remains the main decision-making body and the powers of the executives 
(rector, dean) remain as they were before. Nevertheless, in the period 1996–2005 the HEIs have been 
trying to modernize their management structure. The Higher Education Act of 2005 made it possible for 
institutions to decide on their governmental structure. In practice however, most old academic and 
decision-making structures stay intact (Jongbloed et al., 2008). 
In Latvia, the Constitution (Satversme) of a HEI (representatives of academic staff, students and other 
groups of employees) is the main legal act regulating its activities. The Satversme establishes, among 
other things, the legal status, objectives and spheres of activities, rights, duties and tasks of 
representative, management and decision-making institutions, and so on. In general, it is the Saeima (the 
Parliament) who approves constitutions of state-founded higher education institutions, while the Cabinet 
of Ministers approves those of other institutions. Important here is that the new law of 2006 reduced the 
number of decision-making bodies inside higher education institutions, and paved the way for new 
councils (up to the individual institutions to establish) intended to strengthen the strategic capabilities of 
the institutions. These councils consist of both external and internal representation and perceive as key 
task a greater adaptability to societal needs. 
In Lithuania universities increasingly depend on external stakeholders in their management (Dobbins 
and Leisyte, 2013, Leisyte and Kizniene, 2006). The role of students and other stakeholders in 
institutional management has increased the passing of the HE Law in 2000, which stipulates their 
participation in senate decision-making. With the HE Law of 2009, the university boards were 
established which have decision-making powers and appoint the university rector. The management at 
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universities in this way has been gradually centralized, although the powers of collegial-decision making 
are still quite strong despite the NPM-oriented reforms of the past decade (Leisyte et al. 2014). 
University rectors after the 2009 Law are appointed by the university boards which also have more 
powers in getting involved in strategic planning of the university. 
In New Zealand universities are autonomous, meaning that they are independently managed and 
governed by a council drawn from the community, business, staff and the student body, together with 
local and central government representatives (Ministry of Education, 2015). As a result, the councils are 
constituted to represent various interests and to be properly representative of the wider community 
(Edwards, 2000). 
In the US, the situation is quite diverse since states are responsible for governing public colleges and 
universities (Eckel and King, 2004): some institutions have constitutional autonomy, others have elected 
boards of trustees. In some states, a governing board is appointed by the governor, while in others the 
state board only plays an advisory function (Eckel and King, 2004). Interesting is that “the trustees or 
regents are largely comprised of corporate CEOs and professionals external to academe”. (Slaughter and 
Cantwell, 2011, p. 593). One of the major developments in terms of the internal governance has been 
the changing influence of traditional faculty governance processes. University trustees and policymakers 
have criticized the slow pace of decision making; they have issued calls for streamlining decision-
making procedures so that institutions can respond more rapidly to emerging opportunities in the 
external environment (Association of Governing Boards, 1996). Other observers have called for 
bypassing existing governance committees to rely instead on administratively-appointed planning 
groups (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). In addition, the streamlining of the Boards of Trustees has also been on 
the policy making agenda at HEIs although it started as a self-resignation exercise back in 1987. In this 
line, the recent development of decreasing the number of members in Boards of Trustees is a prime 
example: that too many trustees make the decision-making process cumbersome and ‘burden’ the Board 
(Stripling, 2012). 
In Flanders collegial governance has remained strong. Many of the governing bodies include a 
representation of internal and external stakeholders, but these are elected and decision-making is largely 
collegial (De Wit, 2006). Governance structures have largely remained stable, with as guiding principles 
“collegiate governance, participative governance, openness towards external stakeholders, and elected 
managers” (ib. p. 19). Moreover, in Flanders there is no obligation for HEIs to perform long-term 
strategic planning. With the introduction as of 2015 of institutional audits as part of the quality 
assurance system, the institutions might feel the need to centralize goal-setting and supervision, but this 
remains a question for the future. 
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Overview 
The table below provides an overview of the described countries.  
 
Table 4.2 Overview international comparison 
 Market Budget Autonomy Management 
England Increase in internal 
competition; 
growth of private 
initiatives 
State budget drop; 
strong competition 
for funding 
More government 
interference; use of 
indicators and 
quality assessment 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(‘managerialism’) 
Portugal Increase in internal 
competition; 
promotion of 
private sector 
State budget drop; 
increase in 
performance- and 
competition-based 
funding 
Autonomy for HEIs 
but within a clear set 
of rules including 
quality indicators 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(board with external 
members) 
Netherlands Market-type 
behavior by HEIs; 
institutional 
profiling 
Increase in 
performance-based 
funding; contractual 
relations 
‘Steering at a 
distance’; increase in 
ex post-evaluation 
and quality 
assessment 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(Decentralization of 
decision-making) 
Flanders Highly conditional 
‘market’ 
Output funding Increased autonomy 
within policy 
framework 
Strong collegial 
governance 
Finland HEIs under strict 
legal control 
State as main funder; 
some private funding 
possible 
Increased 
autonomy; 
management by 
results 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(position of rector, 
board with external 
members) 
New Zealand Diminishing 
marketization; 
increasing 
competition 
State as main funder; 
investments plans; 
fee-maxima policy; 
performance based 
funding 
Use of performance 
information; 
autonomy but within 
governments’ vision 
Independent council, 
representative for 
the wider community 
US Strong market 
competition 
Performance funding; 
funding dependent 
on the market 
Low state 
interference 
Diversity among 
states; decrease in 
number of trustees 
Hungary HEIs under state 
control; increased 
competition 
between students 
Introduction of 
students loans; 
withdrawal of state 
funding; ad hoc 
funding strategies  
More performance 
contracts, but strong 
vulnerability and 
limited autonomy 
Fragmented 
governmental 
responsibility; senate 
is main decision 
making body 
Latvia Expansion private 
HEIs 
Contract funding; 
highly diversified 
funding system 
Increased autonomy Constitution is main 
body; trends towards 
a reduction of 
decision making 
bodies; creation of 
new councils with 
representation of 
stakeholders 
Lithuania Increased 
competition 
between 
institutions 
Shift to more output 
and performance 
funding 
More performance 
oriented, increased 
autonomy and 
accountability 
measures 
Still strong collegial 
decision-making; 
importance of 
internal and external 
stakeholders 
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VISIBLE TRENDS  
 
In this paper we have provided a descriptive overview of NPM-related reforms in 10 countries, which 
can be divided in 5 clusters: the Anglo-American tradition (England, New Zealand and the United 
States), the Germanic tradition (the Netherlands and Flanders), the Napoleonic tradition (Portugal), the 
Scandinavian tradition (Finland) and Eastern-Europe countries with a mixed set of characteristics 
(Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania). What patterns of reform can we identify in the 5 clusters?  
 
First, it seems that there is a wave within the Anglo-American tradition. While England and the United 
States have already since decades a strong neoliberal culture, with high autonomy, high competition and 
low state interference and they both seem to pursue in that direction, it seems that New Zealand is 
drifting away from the pure neoliberal discourse that NPM would suggest. Indeed, as an early adopter, it 
seems that New Zealand is moving towards characteristics that could be addressed to NPG: diminishing 
marketization, a representative decision making body, a renewal of state interference but in dialogue 
with HEIs. In other words: characteristics as collaboration and participation have been created to 
counteract a pure market oriented perspective of higher education. As an early adopter it could be that 
New Zealand has been confronted as one of the first with the more negative consequences of NPM and 
has therefore decided to seek for other forms of governance and steering of the system.  
 
Second, the Germanic, Napoleonic and Scandinavian traditions don’t show a clear-cut picture. While 
the Netherlands seem to move towards more marketization, more competition and apparently are 
creating a Higher Education system that shows similarity with NPM-characteristics, it seems that 
Flanders is not quiet exactly following the same path. Despite the increase in autonomy, traditional HE 
system’s characteristics remain intact: high state interference, low marketization, strong collegial 
governance. This is interesting because other policy domains in Flanders have been confronted with 
large NPM-type reforms. From that perspective it seems that Portugal has more similarity with the 
Netherlands than Flanders, despite the fact that it belongs to a different administrative tradition and 
despite the fact that it is perceived as a late adopter of NPM.  Similarly it seems that Finland, apart from 
their governance structure, has more similarity with Flanders and is only adopting NPM at a rather slow 
and hesitating pace. 
 
Third, the Eastern European countries show a mixed picture. While Hungary tries to create more 
autonomy and an increase in competition between HEIs, the funding strategy remains un-transparent, 
the vulnerability of HEIs is high, and their autonomy, despite the performance orientation, remains low. 
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In other words: Hungary is trying to modernize, and it seems that she is adopting NPM-characteristics, 
but is struggling to leave the former characteristics of its system behind. From that perspective is seems 
that Latvia and Lithuania are ahead: the way NPM has been adopted is less ambiguous: competition has 
increased, together with autonomy and accountability. Striking is that both countries are integrating 
internal and external stakeholders in their decision making bodies, which to some extent already touches 
at elements of NPG.  
 
Can we discern a pattern within the above patterns? To some extent it seems so. Countries with a long 
tradition of Higher Education do not easily change their core characteristics: England and the United 
States haven’t really changed the philosophy of their system radically, Flanders and Finland do not 
easily leave behind elements of state interference. To some extent this is probably due to the philosophy 
of the HE system: Flanders and Finland have democracy and large access high on their agenda, while 
England and the US perceive high tuition fees as an indicator of quality. The former explains the 
importance of the state, while the latter emphasizes the market philosophy. The Eastern European 
countries, having a Soviet history, are apparently seeking a HE system that fits best the societal and 
economic needs of the country.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
Under the influence of NPM many changes have been introduced in the HE sector in various countries. 
It was termed ‘new’ because of this very reason (Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013). Never before had 
‘management’ so clearly been positioned as an alternative to collegial governance, that now was 
perceived as slow and inefficient. Traditional universities were ‘invaded’ by managerialism and NPM 
was an inspiration to steer the sector differently (Amaral, 2008). We identified four main reform areas in 
HE: marketization, budgetary reforms, autonomy complemented by accountability, and a new 
management style. When we look at the described developments, a pattern is visible: when reforms are 
made, they go in the direction that NPM would suggest. This leads to the conclusion that NPM has 
penetrated HE policy of many Western countries. On this basis, policy makers have looked to the same 
instruments to implement reforms. In this way, the general thrust of reforms shows similarity across 
countries: elements of marketization have been introduced, state budgets have been reduced and made 
competitive, autonomy has been granted but has been complemented with ex post control, and 
management structures have been verticalised. 
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But although an ‘NPM pattern’ can be discerned in the rationale underlying the ‘modernisation’ of HE, 
we can at the same time identify substantial differences between the countries with regard to the actual 
implementation of NPM-based reforms, that is, the timing, their intensity, and their content. 
Governments have implemented a different mix of instruments, and have put a different focus on each 
of the instruments (for instance, giving priority to budgetary reform). In sum, NPM in HE has been and 
still is a concept underlying HE reforms in many countries, notwithstanding different national contexts 
and administrative traditions. Even in late adopting countries such as Portugal and Finland, NPM has a 
foot in the door. This does not mean, however, that all HE sectors have evolved towards a full NPM 
model in the actual implementation of reforms, quite on the contrary. Like in other policy domains, 
NPM has found its way in HE and in HEIs, but at a different speed and with varied intensity, and always 
filtered by the national context. Governments use the ‘toolbox’ of NPM as they see fit, in the light of 
policy goals which in many cases include tightening of the governmental budget. 
 
Next to the implementation differences, our country overview resonates with the findings from Pollitt 
and Dan (2011) that it is not clear what the effects of the reforms have been. Research does not seem to 
focus a lot on the actual outcomes and effects of NPM implementation. This makes it hard to assess 
whether NPM reforms have actually led to cost reduction, more efficiency and more responsiveness to 
society. In contrast, some of the general critiques on NPM clearly hold true for HE:(1) the economic, 
neo-liberal background of NPM is often found unfit for HE; (2) elements of the collegial system still 
exist in HE; (3) there is resistance both from the HEIs towards the government and within HEIs from 
academics who do not feel they have more autonomy and who perceive quality and performance 
measurement primarily as an administrative burden of tick-box exercises (compare Fumasoli et al., 
2014); (4) increased autonomy has not led to a retreat of the government; and (5) quality assurance 
systems were set up as a means of regulating the sector (Jarvis, 2014). In this way, those NPM-
developments have not led to less but to a different kind of governmental steering which could be 
classified under the concept of ‘the evaluative state’ as referred to by Neave (1998). In other words, 
government continues to govern (Capano, 2011) albeit in other ways, such as digital era governance 
(Peters, 2013) or network governance (Bleiklie et al., 2011; De Wit, 2010; Ferlie et al. 2009). As a 
result, we do not have evidence that NPM-inspired reforms have made universities more efficient and 
effective. For a part this is due to the fact that research has not focused on the actual outcomes of NPM. 
But for another part the reason is that NPM is not a ‘package deal’ but rather a set of instruments or 
tools from which policy makers can pick and choose depending on the circumstances (policy goals, 
political resistance, unintended consequences in the implementation phase, etc.). Because NPM is an 
umbrella concept, it is useful as a way to describe changes in HE, as we have done in this chapter, but it 
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lacks the conceptual clarity needed to be able to link observed effects directly to the concept and its use 
in HE policy. 
Moreover, the scepticism of post-NPM narratives can also be applied to HE. Although NPM favors 
hierarchisation, it has also led to more horizontal relations within and between markets (Amaral, 2008). 
Post-NPM narratives point to degrees of integration, inter-connectedness, and inter-organizational 
networking that cannot be captured by the NPM concept. Some have therefore proclaimed NPM to be 
dead (Dunleavy et al. 2005, cited in Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013). This, however, seems to be a claim 
that comes too early (Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013): as a concept NPM is still pervasive. It can be seen as 
an ideal type that is for the moment here to stay, just as collegial governance has not been completely 
uprooted by NPM but has to an extent kept its place alongside NPM (Goedegebuure and Hayden, 2007). 
This is also seen in the public sector where, traditional bureaucratic culture persists (Wynen and 
Verhoest, 2013). However, it is no wonder that post-NPM concepts such as New Public Governance are 
starting to emerge. New Zealand, for instance, as a trendsetter outside Europe, is shifting its policy from 
a neo-liberal discourse towards a more controlled market where negotiations and participative decision-
making with involvement from societal actors gain more prominence. Another example of counter-
developments is the case of tuition fees in Germany: they were introduced in most Länder in 2007, but 
were abolished again in 2014 (Woelert, 2014). It is highly possible that similar ‘waves’ will be 
identified in other countries in the near future. As our analysis showed: governments often use 
instruments, try them, and change policies afterwards. 
 
To conclude, for HE research, the challenge will be to grasp these and similar contemporary 
developments in HE that are focused on connectedness, integration and networking. This will very 
likely lead to the construction of a new ideal type steering model, that will exist next to NPM or 
gradually replace the NPM model.  The essence will be, first, to unpack the narrative behind the new 
concept when it is used in HE as a management ideal, and second, to find consensus on a clear 
definition of the management tools and instruments that are an inherent part of the new concept, in order 
to turn the ideal type into a research concept that can be used to not only describe, but to critically 
analyse and evaluate reforms in HE. Moreover, an important task for higher education researchers is not 
only to focus on the analysis of the developments, but also to pay considerable attention to the effects 
(positive and negative) of future reforms. 
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